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SPEAKING ABOUT SIGNS
Fourteenth-century views on suppositio materialis
by E. P. Bos - Leiden1
I. Introduction
1.1. On the medieval study of language in general
The medievals attached great value to texts. This might explain their
interest in the signification of terms and of the propositions constituted
by those terms. In the texts that they had available, they also found
different theories of language and of signification: a logical approach in
Aristotle and the Stoics, a theological approach in Augustine, and
grammatical speculations (with a strong semantical orientation) in
Donatus (4th cent.) and Priscian (6th cent.).2
To appreciate the ways in which language was studied in the Middle
Ages, it is useful to note that in the earlier period of medieval philo-
sophy, from Boethius (±500) to Johannes Scottus Eriugena (±810-
±880), there was no clear distinction between a grammatical and a
logical approach to language. In Anselm of Canterbury's De gram-
matica (1033-1109) we see logic beginning increasingly to dominate
grammar. This is also clear in Peter Abaelard (1092-1141). Gram-
matical speculations do not disappear, but remain, for instance in the
grammatica speculativa from Roger Bacon (1214/1220-1292) onward
and in the theories of the so-called Modists. In the fourteenth century,
on which 1 shall concentrate in this paper, logical analysis is pre-
dominant. The relation between logic and grammar plays an important
role in this paper. The theories of semantics were among the most im-
portant medieval contributions to the history of philosophy.
1.2. The problem
Let us consider what happens, from a fourteenth-century philosopher's
point of view, when someone utters a proposition ('proposition' here
in the sense of 'declarative statement' in which something is said about
reality or in which a logical relation is expressed). The speaker is
supposed to have in his mind a proposition of some sort, in what can
be labelled 'mental language'. His intention is that his hearer will
1
 Thanks are due to Dr. J. McAllister (Leiden) for the correction of my English, and
to Dr. G. Sundholm for his suggestions.
2
 The medievals characterized these grammarians as being interested primarily in the
paries oraiiones and in the correct connections of those kinds of words in sentences,
but, like all ancient grammarians, these grammars are semantics-based. C.H. Kneep-
kens, 'The Priscianic Tradition', in Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mutelaller, Ed.
S. Ebbesen (Tübingen 1995). 239-264, esp. 254.
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understand what he means by his words, reconstructing in some way
what is in his mind. So the use of speech is to translate our mental
discourse into verbal form, or a train of thought into a train of words.
Mental language is the primary signification in medieval theories, one
could say, though other kinds of signification are also considered.3
There are different kinds of propositions by which signification is
conveyed. One example is a proposition like 'Socrates is white' (such
'assertorical' propositions are traditionally the preferred kind of
investigation.) But there are other kinds, e.g. intentional propositions,
such as this modal proposition 'All horses can whinny (hinnibilis)';
further, propositions in which a mental act is indicated, e.g. 'John
promises Peter a horse'; and propositions that contain predicates of
second intention4 in which something is said about terms of a lower
level, e.g. 'Dog is a concept-species' (i.e. a logical notion), or 'Dog is
a monosyllable' or 'a monosyllabic word'.
The signification of a proposition such as 'Socrates is white' (e.g.
when Socrates stands before the utterer of the proposition) seems to be
evident. Its signification apparently is determined by the signification
of the term 'Socrates'. The signification of this term is the individual
Socrates. In determining the signification of a proposition, the signi-
fication of the constituent terms are thought to play a pivotal pan, at
least according to the medievals.5
But things are more complicated. What exactly is the signification of
e.g. 'All horses can whinny'? Is it the same property of all horses in
the world? An act emerging from the inner nature of horses? What
ontology is implied here? Propositions with verbs denoting intentional
attitudes, such as 'to promise' in 'I promise you a horse', complicate
matters even further.
The problems involved for the medievals in the two propositions
mentioned above ("Dog' is a concept-species', and "Dog' is a
monosyllable'), in contradistinction to a proposition such as 'A dog is
white', bring us to the subject of this paper. The intricacies become
clearer when we use Latin formulations.
Let us consider three propositions in which 'homo' is the subject
term: 1) 'homo currit' ('a man is running'); 2) 'homo est species'
Cman is a concept-species'); 3) 'homo est vox bisyllaba' ('man is a bi-
syllabic word'). It is clear, I think, that in the first proposition the term
31 use here the term 'signification', to underscore that, in my view, the medieval
semantics is primarily a theory of signs. Therefore I have avoided the term
'meaning', which, according to some modern authors, bears other associations. See I
Hacking, Why Does Language Mauer to Philosophy'! (Cambridge 1975). esp.
chapter 1.
4
 I.e. higher level predicates, e.g. logical notions such as 'genus', 'species' etc.
5
 See e.g. K. Jacobi, 'Abelard and Frege: The Semantics of Words and Propositions',
in Alti del Convegno Internationale di Storia delta Logica [...]. San Gimignano, 4-8
dicembre 1982 (Bologna 1983). 81-96.
73
'homo' refers to a man in reality. This reference of the term is a
'property' (proprietas termini) of the term in the proposition, which
fourteenth-century logicians called, in this case, supposüio personalisß
In the other two propositions the term 'homo' does not refer to extra-
mental thing(s), but, respectively, (2) to a concept-species (the
medievals often called this suppositio simplex, i.e. reference to the
concept belonging to the term as such), and (3) to the word itself, or to
other instances of the same word 'homo'. Especially from the
thirteenth century onwards the medievals called the latter property
suppositio materialist One could say that in the first case the term
'homo' (universally quantified) could be part of sciences that describe
reality; in the second case it could be part of logic, in which higher-
level terms are studied (i.e. terms that refer to other terms charac-
terizing e.g. terms like 'homo' as 'universal' or 'species'); in the third
proposition the term 'homo' refers to itself, or its likes.
It is clear that the last two examples differ from the first in that the
terms do not refer to something in the outside world. This first kind of
signification, also called denotation, is traditionally seen as the primary
form, but the other two kinds also form part of our normal intuitions,
and therefore should arouse interest.
1.3. Modern philosophy
In philosophy since 1900 we see, foremost in Gottlob Frege's Grund-
gesetze der Arithmetik,* and, somewhat later, in Alfred Tarski,9 a
s
 'Maienalis' has nothing 10 do with 'person', as the medievals themselves repeatedly
say: supposai» personalis is a reference to some extra mental reality (see also my
note 35 below).
7
 This has nothing to do with matter, so the medievals say (see also my note 35
below). It must be said, though, that suppositio materialis has to do with the matter
of the word, i.e. the sound.
8
 Jena 1893-1903.
9
 A. Tarski, Einführung in die mathemalische Logik (Göuingen 1966). 72. Id., 'Der
Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen', in Studio Philosophica I (1936)
[Reprinted in K. Berka and L. Kreiser (eds.), Logik-Texte (Berlin, 1973). English
translation in Logic. Semantics, Metamathemaücs, ed. J. Woodger (Oxford, 1956).]
From this translation, I quote Tarski's words: 'In generalization of this viewpoint,
we should have to admit that any word may at times function as its own name; to
»se a terminology of medieval logic, we may say that in a case like this, the word is
used in SUPPOSITIO MATERIALIS, as opposed to its use in SUPPOSITIO FOR-
MALIS, that is, in its ordinary meaning.' For references, see Chr. Kann, 'Materiale
Supposition und die Erwähnung von Sprachzeichen.' in Neue Realiäten, Heraus-
forderung der Philosophie XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie, (20-24 Septem-
ber 1993, TU Berlin) (Berlin 1993). Seklionsbeiträge i), 233-238. Chr. Kann, Die
Eigenschaften der Termini. Eine Untersuchung zur Perutilis Logica Alberts von
Sachsen (Leiden 1994). 81. G. Sundholm, Tractarian Expressions and their Use in
Constructive Mathematics', in Schriftenreihe der WUtgenstein-Gescllschaft Bd 20/1,
Philosophie der Mathematik. Akten des 15. Internationalen Witlgenstein-Sympo-
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distinction between the use of a term and the functioning of a term as
name of itself, by which a term is mentioned. The distinction between
'use' and 'mention' has become standard and resembles to some extent
the different kinds of signification (viz. supposilio personalis and
suppositio materialis) known in the Middle Ages.10 W. V. O. Quine
discusses the use/mention distinction and considers words in
quotation. He advocates the view that in quotation a word is 'pictured',
in other words, a kind of hieroglyph is made, which, as such, has no
parts, i' On the other hand, John Searle has stated that the word 'horse'
in the example "horse' is a word of five letters', should be considered
not as a name, but as a representation of the word.i2
Related to this is the distinction between 'language' and 'meta-
language'. The meta-language seems to be a language in which to de-
scribe another language, e.g. that of science; it forms a kind of con-
sciousness.
Historians of philosophy are aware that this fundamental distinction
can be traced back to the Middle Ages.
1.4. Preliminary remarks
As a preliminary remark, it should be noticed that in modern printed
texts the mentioning of terms can be expressed by quotation marks, as
in "dog' is a monosyllabic word'. In medieval manuscripts such
marks are practically unknown; the medievals wrote e.g. 'homo est
bisyllaba' or 'bisyllabum'. However, the medievals had other ways of
expressing that the term as such was intended, and that they wished to
say something about a term, and not use it in its referring function.
They could use the neuter, e.g. 'homo est bisyllabum', or 'hoc nomen
homo', or 'hoc nomen hominis' and 'hoc quod dicitur homo'. They
also used the little word 'ly', or 'li', perhaps they boorowed it from the
old French.13 'Ly' or 'li' stems from the classical Latin 'ille' and
develops into the modern French 'le'. The use of 'ly' gains an in-
creasingly prominent place as a signum materialitatis ('mark of
materiality', i.e. a mark that a term was accepted according to suppo-
sitio materialis) in fourteenth-century semantics.
It should also be noted that the medieval logicians are not very clear
as to whether the had tokens or types in mind, when they spoke about
siums, Teil I, herausg. von Johannes Czeimak (Wien 1993). 105-118.
10
 N. E. Christensen, The Alleged Distinction between Use and Mention', in
Philosophical Review 76 (1967). 358-367. Cf. Chr. Kann, 'Materiale Supposition
...' (my note 7 above).
1
 ' W.V.O. Quine, Mathematical Logic (Cambridge (Mass.), 1951). 23.
'
2
 J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. (Cambridge
1972 (1969). 74-76.
13
 According to Alan R. Perreiah, in Paulus Venetus, Logica parva. Translation of
the 1472 Edition (...XMiinchen/wien 1984). 41; 165, n. 36a.
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the autonymous use of words. The status of the class of a term like
'homo' in 'homo est bisyllabum' is not clear. Editors should be very
reluctant, 1 feel, to print sentences between quotation marks in which
words apparently should be taken according to suppositio materialis.
Such a way of editing obscures the problem which the medievals had
to solve.
In the present contribution I shall discuss some views on suppositio
materialis, of which examples are 'homo est vox bisyllaba' and 'homo
est nomen'.14 I shall concentrate on some fourteenth-century philo-
sophers, viz., William of Ockham (1285-1347) and the 'Ockhamist'
philosophers John Buridan (±1300-shortly after 1358), Peter of
Mantua (f1400) and Paul of Venice (floruit ±1400). Without being
'Ockhamists' in any strict sense, they attributed supposition to both
subject and predicate terms and had a conceptualistic position on
universals. By way of contrast, as Ockham did I shall discuss the view
of Vincent Ferrer (-1419), whose realist semantics is totally different. I
shall try to give a general outline, rather than an analysis of all aspects
on the subject to be found in the individual philosophers.
The principal questions in my paper are the following: How did the
medieval semamicists indicate the autonymous use of words ? Does the
subject term in such a proposition express a linguistic item (itself, or its
likes) because of the determination by the predicate? Or is it dependent
on the will or intention of man, the voluntas utentium, as Ockham calls
it? Or is it a convention that determines the use of terms? Is a signum
materialitatis (a sign, or mark, indicating material supposition)
necessary? To what extent do the Medievals distinguish the auto-
nymous use of languge from other uses? Or is this kind of language
meaningless?
There is hardly any secondary literature on this subject.15
II. Suppositio materialis
'/./. Until the thirteenth century
St. Augustine (354-420) distinguishes in his De Dialectica between
14
 The latter example is problematic, however. See below, § II.4.1.
151. M. Bochenski, Formale Logik (München 1970(1956). 188-193; C.A. Dufour,
öle Lehre der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik
(München/Hamden/Wien 1989). 172-188. (Dufour tries to reconstruct the medieval
theory of the properties of terms with the help of modem formal logic. This very
interesting study did not obtain the attention it deserves, I feel). E. Karger, 'La
supposition materielle comme supposition significative: Paul de Venise, Paul de
Pergula', in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th
European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 november
''SO, ed. by A. Maieru (Napoli). 331-342. In a penetrating analysis, Karger dis-
cusses the difficulties arising from the 'mentioning' of terms in relation to the
general semantical theory of a philosopher.
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verbum (here 'word') and dictio ('word with meaning', in later
centuries called dicibile).16 Here, I confine myself to these two
aspects. St. Augustine can be said to distinguish between a reflexive
and referential use. We find in an elementary form the distinction
between mention and use. The verbum-nspect of language means that a
word as such is considered, though, of course, it is a sign. The dictio-
aspect is when the attention of the hearer is directed to the thing, or
things, in the outside world.'7
In his Dialectica Peter Abaelard (1092-1142) criticizes some previous
logicians, e.g. Garlandus Compotista (llth century). Garlandus drew
a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, propositions having what
he called 'termini consignificantes' ('consignificant terms'), i.e. in
which the two terms signify the same thing (they 'con-signify', in a
special interpretation of the term), and, on the other, propositions in
which the attention ('attentio') from a subject term goes over to another
concept (what he calls grammatica transitiva), e.g. in 'homo est
nomen'. So he recognized a distinction that later became that between
'suppositio personalia' and 'suppositio materialis', the referential and
autonymous use of terms respectively.18
Abaelard, however, argues that there is in both cases 'intransitive
copulation' or 'consignification' In his view, a proposition with a term
having what is later called suppositio personalis does not differ in kind
from a proposition with a term in suppositio materialis. He seems
implicitly to use the frequently mentioned Boethian rule Talia SUM
subjecta qualia permittuntur per predicata ('Subjects are of such sorts
as the predicates may have allowed')." This rule also played an im-
portant pan in the discussions of suppositio materialis.
The anonymous author of the Fallacie Parvipontane (12th century)
refers the autonymous use of terms, e.g. 'magister est nomen', to
grammar: he calls it transsumptio grammaticorum ('a metaphor of
grammarians').20
16
 Augustine, De Dialectica, translated with Introduction and Notes by B. Darrell
Jackson (from the text newly edited by Jan Pinborg) (Dordrecht [...] 1975). 89; 126,
n. 9.
17
 A good and recent analysis is by H. Ruef, 'Die Sprachtheorie des Augustinus in
De dialectica, in Sprachlheorien in Spätantike und Miltelalter. ed. S. Ebbesen
(Tübingen, 1995). 239-264, 3-11, esp. 8.
18
 Dialectica, Tractalus II, ed. L.M. de Rijk. 166, U. 23-9.
19
 This rule is usually traced back to Boethius. Sherwood already notes thai
Boethius's rule is different, viz. Talia sum predicala qualia permiserinl subiecta.
Boethius means that a predicate such as 'sapiens' has a different meaning when said
of God that it has when said of men. In this form the rule is to be found in
Boelhius, De Triniiale IV, PL 64,1252 A-B, as De Rijk's investigations showed (L.
M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist
Logic (Assen 1967). Vol. II, pan I, 561, n. 4).
20
 L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum. Pan l (Assen 1962). 139; 152; 561f.
Transumpùo is the second mode of univocauo.
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II.2. The thirteenth century
William of Sherwood (±1200/10-1266/72; he studied in Oxford and
Paris, and was active as a master in Oxford) wrote a very interesting
and well organized handbook of logic, the Introductions^ ad logicam.
This work is as remarkable as the well known Tractatus of Peter of
Spain, whom I shall not discuss here, as he is less interesting than
Sherwood for our purposes.21
Sherwood divides supposition into two sorts, material and formal.22
Formal supposition occurs when a term 'supposits what it signifies'
('supponit suum significatum'), as Sherwood expresses it.23 He
subdivides formal supposition into simple and personal: it is simple
when a word supposits what it supposits for what it signifies (e.g.
'homo est species'); it is personal when a word supposits what it
signifies for a thing that is subordinate to what it signifies, e.g. in
'Socrates currit'.24 In material supposition a word stands for a sound
as such, or for the sound and its significance. So he subdivides
material supposition, and distinguishes between the cases of'homo' in
'homo est bisyllabum', where the term stand for a sound as such, and
of 'homo' in 'homo est nomen', where the term stands for the sound
and its significate.
In his Introductiones Sherwood answers to an objection raised on
occasion of his subdivision of supposition into material and formal.25
An opponent says that this subdivision implies different ways, not of
supposition but of signification, because signification is a presentation
of the form of something to the understanding. Now, when a word has
material supposition, the opponent continues, it presents either itself or
its utterance; however, in formal supposition it presents what it
signifies. So the opponent, I conclude, considers the two kinds of
signification as equivocal, because in formal supposition, it presents
something different from what it signifies in material suposition (which
is a more attractive view, I think).
Sherwood's solution to the problem is instructive as a background
for fourteenth-century views. He says that a word considered in itself
(quantum de se est) always presents its signification, not only in formal
21
 The works seems to have been composed independently of each other, as the
investigations of De Rijk have shown (L.M. de Rijk, 'Introduction', in Petrus
Hispanus: Traaalus, VII-CXX1X). See also William of Sherwood, Introductions in
Logicam. Einführung in die Logik, Textkritisch herausgegeben, Übersetzt,
eingeleitet und mit Anmerkungen versehen von H. Brands und Chr. Kann.
Lateinisch-Deutsch (Hamburg 1994). XÜI.
22
 Ed. H. Brandts and Chr. Kann, 136, 39-44. See also my note 9, the quotadon
from Tarski.
23
 Ed. H. Brandts and Chr. Kann, 136,1.43-44.
William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, translated with an Introduction and
Noies by N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis 1966). 109.
25
 Ed. H. Brandts and Chr. Kann. 138,81-140.95.
78
but also in material supposition. And when it stands for its utterance,
this is the result of the adjunction of the predicate, for some predicates
tend to be related to the utterance or word, and others to the significate.
This does not produce, however, a different signification. A word has
signification before it enters into a proposition. Signification and
supposition are different. So, according to Sherwood, the two kinds of
supposition are not equivocal.
Somewhat later Sherwood discusses the nature of the relationship
between subject and predicates.» Because a predicate is said to be in a
subject, a form is always predicated. Now, a subject sometimes
signifies its form absolutely, Sherwood says, and sometimes not,
according to the requirements of the predicate in virtue of the principle:
talia sum subiecta qualia permiserint predicata. In Sherwood's
approach the comparison between subject and predicate is pivotal, and
is based on the Boethian rule.
Christensens's suggestion is interesting in this respect.27 When we
say something about a word, we do not form a name of it, but produce
it itself. For example when we say 'Boston is disyllabic', the word
'Boston' is not used autonomously, so it is not an ambigous name with
respect to the same name in its referring funtion, but in both functions,
i.e. both as referring and as autonymous, they are actual and direct
productions of the objects themselves, about somewhnig true is stated.
So Christensen says that the word 'Boston' is actualised in object-
language, not in meta-language. We may conclude that in his view
there is a difference not between use and mention of a word but
between different usages of a word, depending on the predicate.
The problem in Sherwood's solution is, I think, that always a form is
signified. We might agree that to appreciate e.g. 'homo est nomen',
one has to know what 'homo' means, and, following Sherwood's
realism, to what nature 'homo' refers.28 However, when saying
'homo est bisyllabum', or 'blituri est trisyllabum' there seems to be no
form. So these propositions do not have a place in Sherwood's
semantics, I think.
11.3. The fourteenth century
II.3.1. William ofOckham
William of Ockham (1285-1347) was active in Oxford and Paris. His
26
 Ed. H. Brandts and Chr. Kann. 144,165-175.
27
 N. E. Christensen, The Alleged Distinction between Use and Mention', in
Philosophical Review 76 (1967). 358-367. See also J. Pinborg, Logik und
Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Oberblick. 64-65.
28
 W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford 1962). 254 find
William's reply unsatisfactory, for when in speech or writing we say that 'homo' is a
noun, we are not using the word 'homo' in the ordinary way at all. But this criticism
goes a bit too far, as I explain in the text above.
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significance lies principally in his rejection of the ontological and
epistemological realism of earlier masters, which he replaced by
epistemological conceptualism. According to Ockham, a term, in
whatever proposition, always can have personal supposition. One can,
however, take a term differently, if it is limited (arciatio) to another
supposition on the basis of the will of the speaker.29 So the person
matters who intentionally frames a proposition. A term can have
material supposition only if it is compared with another term, which is
an intentio anime, or signifies a spoken or written word. It can have
simple supposition, i.e. in 'homo est species'. This is impossible in
e.g. 'homo currit', Ockham says, but it is possible in e.g. 'homo est
species', because species signifies an intentional being.30 So Ockham
implicitly uses the principle talia sunt subiecta etc., though secondarily.
According to Ockham supposition is subdivided into personal,
simple, and material.31 A term having personal supposition can refer to
1) a thing in the outer world, 2) a word, 3) a concept, 4) a written sign.
E.g. 1) 'Every man is an animal'; 2) 'Every vocal noun is a part of
speech', 3) 'Every species is an universal'; 4) 'Every written word is a
word'. 'Homo' in 'Homo est nomen' does not have material
supposition by definition, but it has personal supposition when 'homo'
refers to the noun 'homo' as a quality, i.e. as a real accident of the
mind, having 'subjective' existence, as Ockham calls it, i.e. as far as it
is a kind of reality inhering in the soul. The difference depends on the
way the term is accepted
Material supposition is, according to Ockham, non-significative.32
Here he disagrees with Sherwood, among others. In material suppo-
sition, the term stands for a word or a written sign (itself, or its likes).
Quite interestingly, Ockham's example is 'homo est nomen' in which
'homo' supposas for itself, and still does not signify itself. All these
kinds of supposition apply not only to spoken and written terms, but
also to mental terms (mental terms, too, can have material supposition,
according to Ockham this point of view does not pass without
discussion in the Middle Ages.33)
In Ockham, only language in personal supposition is meaningful in
the strict sense. There is some pressure, I think, for him to accept only
personal supposition in mental language.34 The terms 'personal',
'material', and 'simple', are used equivocally in logic and in the other
29
 'ex voluntate uientium': Summa logicae 1,65, 197,1. 7.
Summa logicae I, 65.
Summa logicae I, 64.
Summa logicae, I, 64,1. 38-40: Suppositio materials est quando terminus non
supponit significative, sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro scripto.
33
 See below, 11,4,2.
34
 See also P. V. Spade, 'Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two Conflicts in His
Theory', in Vivarium 12 (1974). 63-73 [Reprinted as no. IX in P. V. Spade, Lies,
Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages (London 1988)].
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sciences, he says.35 Logicians apply to all these terms the term
'suppositio', Ockham adds.
So 'homo' in 'Homo est nomen' can be taken in different ways, viz.
according to material and according to personal supposition. This is
decided not by the predicate, which is the same in both cases, but
according to the way someone uses the language and according to his
will and consideration of things. This 'subjective' aspect is primary, I
feel.
11.3.2. John Buridan
In his Summulae, tract IV, which is on supposition and signification,
John Buridan (active in Paris, and influential in France and central
Europe; he lived ±1300-shortly after 1358) divides supposition into
material and personal.36 He notes that some philosophers have
introduces a third category, which they call 'simple supposition'. Some
of those logicians opine that in that case the term refers to general
natures, such as Plato's ideas. This opinion has already been refuted
by Aristotle, Buridan says. Others define simple supposition as a term
standing for a concept according to which it has received imposition.
They define material supposition as a term standing for itself or its like.
Buridan thinks these views to be acceptable. He does not flatly reject
simple supposition, but he is not interested in the distinction, because
the terms are taken non-significatively. Therefore, he calls both
properties of a term 'material supposition' as opposed to personal.37
Spoken and written terms can be species and genera, but they are not
universals in a strict sense. The latter are mental concepts. So a spoken
or written term (in short: a conventional term), which is in the focus of
his interest, can have material supposition. In that kind of supposition,
a word stands not only for itself but also for another such word or its
like. Complex expressions too can also have material supposition, e.g.
when such a complex functions as subject in a proposition. E.g. in
'Hominem esse lapidem est falsum', the accusative and infinitive con-
struction stands for the indicative proposition 'Homo est lapis'. Unlike
Ockham, Buridan does not attribute great importance to the relation
between spoken and written language on the one hand, and mental
3
' Summa logicae. Opera Philosophica. I {St. Bonaventure 1974), 64, 197,1. 60-
65: Est autem sciendum quod non dicitur suppositio 'personalis' quia supponit pro
persona, nee 'simplex' quia suponit pro simplici, nee 'materialis' quia supponit pro
maiena. scd propter causas dictas. Et ideo isti termini materiale', 'personale',
'simplex' aequivoce usitamur in logica et in aliis scienuis; tarnen in logica non
usiiantur frequenter nisi cum isti addito 'suppositio'.
36
 Buridan first divides supposition into proper and improper. An example of the
latter is 'pratum ridel', or 'homo est asrnus.
37
 Buridan, Summulae, Tractaus IV, in Giovanni Buridano: Tractalus de Suppo-
sitionibus' (Vienna, BibLPal. 3565), Prima edizione a cura M. E. Reina. Rivista
critica ai Sioria aella Filosofia 12 (1957). 175-208 and 323-352, esp. 201,1.42f.
